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Abstract 
This  novel  empirical  study  contributes  to  the literature on  the foreign exchange market  and 
financial liberalisation. We examine the determinants of Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) in a 
panel of forty countries, using a statistical approach to measure market pressure, with particular 
focus upon the impact of capital controls. We also consider whether EMP is related to a range of 
other  macroeconomic  indicators,  policy  variables  and  trade  openness.  We  find  that  capital 
controls are associated with weaker currencies, especially for advanced countries. Our results are 
robust to potential endogeneity and different measures of exchange market pressure. 
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1.  Introduction 
  A long standing academic literature has recommended using capital controls to deal with 
the challenges of financial globalisation, see inter alia Tobin (1978), Eichengreen and Wyplosz 
(1993), Krugman (1998) and Stiglitz (1999). With the global financial crisis and a recent surge in 
capital  inflows  to  emerging  markets,  capital  controls  are  back  on  the  academic  and  policy 
agenda,  see  Baba  and  Kokenyne  (2011),  Schmitt-Grohé  and  Uribe  (2012a,b),  De  Paoli  and 
Lipinska (2013), and Eichengreen and Rose (2014a,b). The former Brazilian Finance Minister 
Guido  Mantega  was,  for  example,  a  vociferous  critic  of  other  countries’  competitive 
devaluations. He went so far as to label them “international currency wars” and responded with a 
series of controls to avoid the impact upon the Brazilian Real.
3 Brazil is not alone in recently re-
introducing controls. Cyprus and Iceland have also imple mented different forms of capital 
controls, see Eichengreen and Rose (2014b). Overall IMF member countries have increased their 
use of capital controls from  164 measures by July 2012 to 202 measures by August 2013, see 
IMF (2012, 2013).
4   
Given this context, it is relevant to ask the following questions. What is the impact of 
capital controls upon  the exchange rate? Shall the impact be different across advanced and 
emerging market economies? And do capital controls matter more or less during crisis periods in 
the FX market? In principle,  controls may be associated with weaker or stronger currencies. 
Some believe capital controls may counter capital inflows that appreciate the domestic currency, 
and also fuel a consumption boom and asset price bubbles,  see Chamon and Garcia, (2013). In 
                                                           
3 See Financial Times (2010), Stiglitz (2012), Ostry et al. (2012), Chamon and Garcia (2013) and Table A in the 
appendix for more details on Brazil’s recent experience with capital controls. 
4 Capital controls have always been permissible by the IMF (Gallagher, 2011), but it was surprising that the IMF 
recently expressed the institutional view that “in certain circumstances, capital flow management measures can be 
useful,” IMF (2012a).  
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contrast  the currency  crisis  literature has  widely  documented a link between capital  account 
liberalization  and  domestic  currency  stability.
5 The existing empirical  literature  rejects the 
hypothesis  that  capital  controls  insulat e  an  economy  from  external  shocks.  This  evidence 
requires reinvestigation, given the recent revival  of capital controls and the earlier literature’s 
limitation  that  it  models  FX  market  pressure  using  a  simple  dummy  variable  approach,  see 
Edwards (2006); Glick et al. (2006); and Glick and Hutchison (2011).   
This paper’s main objective consequently is to empirically model the main determinants 
of Exchange Market Pressure (EMP), using measures from Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Girton 
and Roper (1977). Exchange Market Pressure is the sum of changes in the exchange rate, foreign 
reserves and/or interest rates. We seek to add to evidence on the effectiveness of capital controls 
in insulating an economy from destabilising capital inflows. We are unaware of any other studies 
that evaluate the effects of capital account liberalization on a continuous measure of exchange 
market pressure, with a large panel dataset of advanced and emerging market economies. Our 
continuous measure of EMP conveys more information than a simple discrete speculative attack 
dummy; see Mandilaras and Bird (2008). This paper models capital controls using the Chinn and 
Ito (2008) Index of capital account openness. Furthermore, a number of control variables are 
used to evaluate the effects of trade openness, policy regimes and macroeconomic fundamentals. 
This paper endeavours to account for the potential endogeneity of capital controls and EMP by 
using Instrumental Variables. Our large panel dataset helpfully allows us to consider whether 
capital  controls  have  a  different  impact  across  advanced  economies  and  emerging  markets. 
Finally, we examine whether crisis periods are especially related to capital control measures by 
                                                           
5 More generally see Edison et al. (2002) for a survey of literature on capital account liberalization and economic 
performance.  
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using Probit analysis for our sample of forty countries. Hence, we contribute to the literature on 
the FX market and the impact of country characteristics. 
This paper proceeds as follows. Firstly, we set  out our methodology: our continuous 
measure of Exchange Market Pressure and the empirical methods used in the paper. In the third 
section we discuss our panel dataset and present our Instrumental Variable and Probit empirical 
results. The last section concludes and offers some policy prescriptions. 
2. Methodology 
2.1 Exchange Market Pressure Index 
  We begin with a discussion of issues related to our key variable of interest. Our preferred 
measure of Exchange Market Pressure (EMP) consists of a weighted average of the exchange 
rate,  relative  interest  rates  and  foreign  exchange  reserves.  It  is  sometimes  argued  that  the 
components of an exchange market pressure index depend on the structure of the economy and 
therefore,  must  be  derived  from  a  structural  macroeconomic  model  of  exchange  rate 
determination.  However,  structural  exchange  rate  models  that  link  the  exchange  rate  to 
macroeconomic variables have found it challenging to forecast better than a random walk, see 
Meese and Rogoff (1983). Due to the controversial nature of exchange rate models, we adopt 
Eichengreen’s et al. (1996) statistical approach to construct an Exchange Market Pressure Index 
for a panel of forty countries as follows: 
))] ( ( )) ( ( ) [( * *
it it i it it i it i it f f i i s EMP                         (1) 
This exchange market pressure index EMPit for country i at time t is therefore a weighted sum of 
spot exchange rate changes (Δsit), relative interest rate change  ) ( *
it it i i    and relative foreign  
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exchange  reserve  changes  ) ( *
it it f f   .  Lower  case  variables  have  been  transformed  into 
logarithmic form and the Greek letterdenotes the first difference operator. The spot exchange 
rate ( it s ) is defined as the log price of the US$ in domestic currency units. Hence, a rise in  it s  is 
a domestic currency depreciation. An asterisks (*) denotes the foreign counterpart of domestic 
variables.  
Modelling exchange market pressure using only exchange rate changes is not enough as 
monetary authorities may alleviate upward pressure for example by raising interest rate and/or 
spending  foreign  exchange  reserves.  Therefore,  interest  rate  and  foreign  exchange  reserve 
changes constitute valid components of an exchange market pressure index. An increase in the 
exchange rate, a rise in interest rate and a loss of foreign exchange reserves imply an increase in 
exchange market pressure. The parameters i  ,  i   and  i  in equation (1) are weights assigned to 
components  of  the  exchange  market  pressure  index  and  are  based  on the  inverse  of  their 
volatilities.  This  assigns  a  low  weight  to  more  volatile  components  and  thus  ensures  equal 
importance of all components. This approach also has the advantage that it is not conditional 
upon implicit macroeconomic assumptions, for example those made by Girton and Roper (1977) 
and Weymark (1995). Nevertheless, in our empirical analysis we assess the robustness of our 
results by also using a measure of exchange market pressure from Girton and Roper (1977). 
Girton and Roper (1977), hereafter GR, first used a monetary model of exchange rate 
determination  and  derived  an  exchange  market  pressure  index  which  is  a  simple  sum  of 
exchange rate and foreign exchange reserve changes. It assigns equal weights to both exchange 
rate  and  foreign  exchange  reserve  changes;  it  does  not  require  the  estimation  of  any  model 
parameters to derive the weights of the index. Roper and Turnovsky (1980) on the other hand,  
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used a macroeconomic model to  derive the trade-off that monetary authorities face between 
targeting domestic credit and the exchange rate when stabilizing domestic output. The derived 
exchange market  pressure  index  is  the  sum  of exchange rate  and foreign exchange reserves 
changes. However, both index components are not equally important, requiring the estimation of 
six parameters to construct these weights. Weymark (1995) also construct an exchange market 
pressure index based upon a macro-model and  requires  the  estimation  of two parameters  to 
assign weights  to  the  foreign exchange reserve component of  the  exchange market  pressure 
index. In contrast to these studies, Pentecost et al. (2001) used a wealth augmented monetary 
model and derived an exchange market pressure index which is a simple sum of the exchange 
rate, foreign exchange reserve and relative interest differential changes. Only one parameter has 
to be estimated in the construction of Pentecost’s et al. (2001) exchange market pressure index. 
Our empirical work focuses upon the Eichengreen et al. (1996) statistical measure of market 
pressure, as it accounts for interest rate changes and standardises each component of the index.  
  The empirical market pressure literature has mainly focused on macroeconomic variables 
as EMP determinants. Girton and Roper (1977) first examined the determinants of exchange 
market  pressure  for  Canada.  The  estimated  equation  used  domestic  and  foreign  monetary 
aggregates, and domestic and foreign income as exchange market pressure explicators. Connolly 
and  da  Silveira  (1979)  applied  the  GR  model  of  exchange  market  pressure  to  the  postwar 
Brazilian monetary  experience. Their single equation  approach  used domestic credit, foreign 
prices and domestic income as exchange market pressure determinants. A dynamic GR model 
was applied to Canada by Burdekin and Burkett (1990) and they used the US and Canadian GDP 
deflator,  and  Treasury  Bill  Rate  as  EMP  determinants.  Kim  (1985),  Thornton  (1995)  and 
Bahmani-Oskooee and Bernstein (1999) slightly modified the Connolly and da Silveira (1979)  
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version of GR and used the money multiplier as an additional independent variable. Wohar and 
Lee (1992) extended GR and included foreign real income, foreign money supply and foreign 
interest  rate  as  regressors.  Pollard  (1999)  used  Wohar  and  Lee’s  (1992)  specification  and 
evaluated the effects of net central bank credit as a percentage of high powered money, the 
money multiplier, foreign money supply, deviations from purchasing power parity, domestic and 
foreign real income, and the interest rate differential on market pressure. These studies indicate 
that domestic credit, foreign price, domestic real income, the US Treasury Bill Rate, money 
multiplier and deviations from purchasing power parity are the main determinants of exchange 
market pressure. We account for this literature in our results section. 
The studies discussed above have evaluated individual country exchange market pressure 
determinants using time series data. However, Bird and Mandilaras (2006) and Mandilaras and 
Bird (2008) are multi-country studies and evaluate the determinants of exchange market pressure 
using a panel approach. The former study focused on the effects of fiscal imbalance on exchange 
market  pressure  for  East  Asian  and  Pacific  and  Latin  American  countries.  The  latter  study 
examined  the  relationship  between  market  pressure  and  the  foreign  debt  burden  for  Latin 
American countries. Furthermore, they use monetary aggregates, unemployment and measures of 
banking system health as control variables. The empirical evidence obtained from these studies 
show that the budget balance as percent of GDP, fixed and intermediate exchange rate regime, 
Federal  Funds  Rate,  short  term  debt,  domestic  credit  and  total  debt  are  important  exchange 
market pressure determinants in a panel framework. Following Bird and Mandilaras (2006) and 
Mandilaras and Bird (2008) we also advocate multi-country panel methods in this context. Next 
we  set  out  the  empirical  methods  utilized  in  this  paper,  which  focuses  on  the  relationship 
between exchange market pressure and capital controls.  
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2.2 Econometric Methods   
  We adopt as our benchmark empirical model the Least Square Dummy Variable (LSDV) 
approach for evaluating the determinants of exchange market pressure in our panel of advanced 
and emerging market economies. Our benchmark panel model suggests EMPit, for country i at 
time t, is a linear function of country intercepts, ci, and a vector of independent variables, xit: 
, it it i it u x c EMP       ) , 0 ( ~
2
u it IID u                 (2) 
Where   is a vector of parameters. The error term ( it u ) has zero mean and constant variance. 
Furthermore,  it  is  assumed  that  all xit  are  independent  of  all  uit,  that  is  0 ] [  it itu x E .  Our 
benchmark panel model takes account of country heterogeneity by allowing the intercept to vary 
across countries, hence taking account of differences in the structure of each economy under 
consideration. After introducing a dummy variable for each country to denote time invariant 
heterogeneity in their economies, we write equation (2) as:   
it it ij
N
j
j it u x d c EMP   


'
1
                   (3) 
However, the introduction of too many  regressors in equation (3) renders this regression model 
unattractive. In order to avoid this problem, we estimate the regression model in deviation from 
individual means which enables us to eliminate individual effects ,  i c . The regression model in 
deviation form is as follows: 
i i i i u x c EMP    
'                     (4)  
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Where  i EMP  is a mean of the dependent variable and is defined as  

 
T
t
it i EMP T EMP
1
1 ;  i x  
and  i u  are defined in a similar way. Therefore, having subtracted equation (4) from equation (2), 
we obtain equation (5) as follows: 
) ( ) ( i it i it i it u u x x EMP EMP                      (5) 
Equation (5) is a regression model in deviation from individual means and does not contain 
individual  country  effects  ci.  The  ordinary  least  square  estimate  of    obtained  from  this 
transformed model is the fixed effect estimator and is given as: 
) )( ( ) )( ( ˆ
1 1
1
1 1
i it i
N
i
T
t
it
N
i
T
t
i it i it FE EMP EMP x x x x x x     




    
 

 
            (6) 
The  use  of  a  fixed  effects  approach  with  first  differenced  data  overcomes  any  potential 
nonstationarity issues. However, some of the variables used in the estimated exchange market 
pressure equation may be simultaneously determined. It is possible that pressure on the exchange 
rate may lead to the imposition of capital controls. Some of the explicators below, for example 
remittances, the reserve import ratio and real exchange rate, share terms with the dependent 
variable. Moreover, trade openness could be endogenous through the feedback between trade and 
financial  openness.  Aizenman  (2003)  illustrates  that  greater  trade  openness  increases  the 
effective  cost  of  enforcing  financial  repression.  Financial  openness  is  thus  a  by-product  of 
greater  trade  integration.  There  could  also  be  reverse  causality,  because  greater  financial 
openness may reduce the cost of trade credit and encourage foreign direct investment, and both 
may provide incentives  to more commercial trade. This result in a simultaneity problem for 
capital controls. In such a situation, Ordinary Least Squares suffers from bias which can be  
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avoided using instruments for endogenous variables in the regression.
6 The instruments used 
must be (a) uncorrelated with the error term, (b) correlated with the endogenous variable, and (c) 
must not be an explanatory variable in the original regression (Murray, 2006). Two Stage Least 
Squares  is an example of  Instrumental  Variable estimation. It requires  an  equal number of 
instruments and endogenous variables.
7 It is commonly observed that the instrument used for an 
endogenous variable is weakly correlated with the endogenous variable in question. Using such a 
variable as  an  instrument is likely to produce larger standard errors and hence insignificant 
estimators (Verbeek, 2008).
8  
The final estimator used in this paper is the Probit Limited Dependent Variable approach. 
We follow Eichengreen et al. (1996) and construct  a crisis index using the following criterion: 
1  it Crisis if EMPit > 1.5σEMP + μEMP; and  0  it Crisis otherwise, where σEMP and μEMP are the 
unconditional standard deviation and mean of EMPit. We now go on to discuss the data in the 
paper and present our results. 
 
[TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
 
                                                           
6 Ordinary least square estimation is biased due to correlation between error term and one of the explanators in the 
regression equation. Such a correlation  may result from an endogenous variable, a mismeasured explanator, an 
omitted explanator or lagged dependent variable among the explanators (Murray, 2006). 
7 The equation is exactly identified when the number of instruments equals the number of endogenous e xplanators. 
The equation is overidentified if the number of instruments exceeds the number of endogenous variables.   
8 Two other problems associated with the use of weak instruments are (a) Use of an instrument despite weak 
correlation  between  endogenous  variables  and  instrument  can  lead  to  inconsistency  in  instrumental  variable 
estimates, and (b) OLS and IV estimates bias in the same direction in finite sample. As  the R
2 between instrument 
and endogenous variable approaches zero, the magnitude of the IV bias approaches that of OLS (Bound et al. 1995).   
11 
 
3. Results 
3.1. Data 
  This study uses annual data from 1977 to 2012 in a panel of up to forty advanced and 
emerging market economies.  See Table 1 for the list of countries used in this study. To construct 
our Eichengreen et al. (1996) exchange market pressure index the main source of data are the 
World  Bank’s  World  Development  Indicators  and  the  International  Monetary  Fund’s 
International  Financial  Statistics.  Capital  controls  are  proxied  by  the  Chinn  and  Ito  (2008) 
capital account openness index. Chinn and Ito (2008) construct an openness index using data on 
capital  account  restrictions  reported  in  the  IMF’s  Annual  Reports  on  Exchange  Rate 
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (AREAER). Chinn and Ito (2008) construct their index 
through two steps. Firstly, they assign a dummy variable for four major categories on external 
accounts  such  as  the  presence  of  multiple  exchange  rates,  restrictions  on  capital  account 
transactions, restrictions on current account transactions and requirements to surrender export 
proceeds. Secondly, they construct the index of capital account openness through a standardised 
principal  component.  An  increase  in  the  index  implies  increasing  capital  account  openness. 
Hence, the Chinn and Ito (2008) capital account openness index is a continuous variable and has 
the advantage that it attempts to measure the intensity of capital controls.  
Figure 1. Exchange Market Pressure and Capital Controls 
[FIGURE 1 HERE] 
Notes: this graph presents Exchange Market Pressure data from Eichengreen et al. (1996) (grey line) and 
Capital Controls (black line). Data is for Australia, Argentina, Brazil and Spain between 1977 and 2012. A 
rise in EMP is a rise in FX market pressure (left hand scale). A rise in the capital account openness index is 
a fall in capital controls (right hand scale). Correlations between EMP and controls for these countries are 
negative, and range from -0.04 for Spain and -0.36 for Brazil. Australia and Argentina correlations are        
-0.10 and -0.30 respectively. 
Figure  1  presents  some  indicative  graphical  evidence  to  illustrate  the  relationship 
between  exchange  market  pressure  and  capital  controls.  The  figure  highlights  that  capital  
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account liberalisation has been pursued in the advanced and emerging market economies but 
there have been reversals in Australia, Argentina and Brazil. Brazil has recently reintroduced 
capital controls due to capital inflows and a strong Brazilian Real. Brazilian exchange market 
pressure has subsequently become negative. Overall for these four countries there has been a 
negative  unconditional correlation  between EMP and capital  controls  for our sample period. 
Eichengreen and Rose (2014a) suggest capital controls are persistent, with little evidence of 
substantial  and frequent changes  in  controls.  Given the  high  volatility  of EMP compared to 
capital controls, this highlights the need for panel estimation to exploit time series and cross 
sectional variation across countries, and also to consider additional explicators of EMP. 
The data on monetary aggregates is taken from World Bank WDI for all countries except 
Austria,  Canada,  Germany,  Greece  and  Spain,  which  is  taken  from  IMF  IFS  and  OECD 
statistics. Trade openness data is taken from WDI. Since the number of time series observations 
used  in  this  study  differs  to  some  extent  from  country  to  country,  our  panel  data  set  is 
unbalanced. See Table B in the Appendix for further details on the data sources used in this 
paper. 
3.2. Empirical Results 
  This  paper  uses  fixed  effects  and  instrumental  variable  (i.e.  two  stage  least  squares) 
estimation  methods  that  includes  cross  section  effects  for  evaluating  the  determinants  of 
exchange market pressure in a panel of up to forty countries. We then go on to consider Probit 
estimation using random effects. Our main focus is on the relationship between capital controls   
( it K ) and exchange market pressure (EMPit), but we also consider the exchange rate regime, 
inflation targeting, trade openness, and other key macroeconomic variables. The most general 
specification we use in this paper is given as:  
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it it it it it it it
it it it it i it
u y rem m r IT Intermed
Fixed q O K EMP
          
     
10 9 8 7 6 5
4 3 2 1
     
    
                         (7) 
0 , , 9 8 3     ,  0 , , , 7 6 5 4         
The sign and significance of the coefficient  1   on capital account openness ( it K ) is uncertain a 
priori  and  central  to  our  analysis.  The  additional  determinants  of  EMP  that  we  consider  in 
equation (7) are: current account openness ( it O ); the change in the real exchange rate ( it q  ); the 
inflation targeting regime ( it IT );
9 change in the reserve import ratio ( it r  ); change in monetary 
aggregates  ( it m  );  change  in  remittances  ( it rem  );  and  growth  in  real  income  ( it y  ).  The 
Ilzetzki et al. (2008) coarse index of de facto exchange rate regimes is used to construct Fixedit 
and Intermedit, which are dummy variables for fixed and intermediate exchange rate regimes 
respectively.  For  a  fixed  regime,  a  value  of  1  is  assigned  to  no  separate  legal  tender,  pre-
announced peg or currency board arrangement, pre-announced horizontal band that is narrower 
than or equal to  % 2   and de facto pegs. An Intermedit dummy is constructed by assigning a 
value of 1 to a de facto crawling peg, pre-announced crawling peg, a de facto crawling band that 
is wider than or equal to  % 5  , a moving band that is wider than or equal to  % 2   and managed 
float. See Appendix Table C for further details. 
Trade openness has also remained a contentious issue in the empirical literature on EMP. 
The opponents of trade openness argue that a weakening of a country’s export sector reduces the 
inflow of foreign capital and increases susceptibility to market pressure. Frankel and Cavallo 
(2008)  argued  that  trade  and  capital  account  openness  go  hand-in-hand,  which  reduces  a 
country’s ability to effectively implement capital controls. Rose (2005) explains that strong trade 
                                                           
9 We follow Petursson (2004) when constructing our inflation targeting dummy variable.  
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links  reduce  a  country’s  default  probabilities  and  hence  reduces  pressure  on  the  domestic 
currency to depreciate. Hence, our study also considers the impact of trade openness on exchange 
market pressure. 
[TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 2 presents our first set of results on the determinants of exchange market pressure. 
Column [1] uses fixed effects estimation to take account of unobserved heterogeneity, as set out 
in equation (6), and the Eichengreen et al. measure of market pressure (EMP1) for both advanced 
and  emerging  market  countries.  There  is  little  evidence  capital  or  current  account  openness 
matter for exchange rate pressure in column [1]. In contrast, money is important with fixed 
effects estimation: an increase in the money supply is associated with an increase in exchange 
market pressure, consistent with the monetary approach to exchange rate determination. The real 
exchange rate  has  a  significant  and positive  link with EMP1. While income, reserves,  fixed 
regimes and remittance have a negative association. However, fixed effects estimation does not 
account for potential endogeneity. In response to strong exchange market pressure to appreciate 
for example, a government may introduce capital controls. Hence, we subsequently focus upon a 
2SLS Instrumental Variable (IV) with fixed effects estimator in the rest of our analysis.  
Table  2  column  [2]  provides  our  first  IV  estimates.  While  capital  controls  remain 
insignificant  with  IV,  the  coefficient  and  t-statistic  have  increased.  Indeed,  once  we  take  a 
General-to-Specific  approach  and  delete  insignificant  variables  in  column  [3],  we  find  that 
exchange market pressure is significantly related to capital controls at the 10% level. We also 
consider whether this result is robust to the Girton-Roper market press measure (i.e. EMP2). For 
this large panel of countries we find evidence that capital controls are strongly related to market  
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pressure. In addition, column [5] implies trade openness is related to EMP2. This first set of 
results suggests that capital controls and trade openness may be important for market pressure. 
We  take  account  of  unobserved  fixed  effects  in  Table  2,  but  there  may  be  differences  in 
responses to capital controls across our broad panel of countries. Hence we next split our panel 
into  advanced  and  emerging  market  countries,  especially  given  we  have  a  large  number  of 
countries and income may matter for the determinants of EMP.
10 
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
Table 3 indicates that capital account openness matters for exchange market pressure in 
advanced economies,  when using  IV and  irrespective of the measure of  exchange market 
pressure. An increase in capital account openness is linked to a reduction in both measures of 
market pressure. There are two channels through which capital account openness  may reduce 
exchange market pressure.  First, market liquidity increases with  an  increase in international 
capital flows. An increase in market liquidity in turn accelerates economic growth primarily b y 
boosting productivity growth. Second,  the efficiency of the domestic financial sector improves 
due to the presence of foreign banks, which in turn spurs economic growth (Levine, 2001). Better 
macroeconomic fundamentals reduce market pressure, a finding consistent with first generation 
currency crisis models, see Krugman (1979) .  This is a key result in ou r  paper. In addition, 
movements in the real exchange rate also are linked to EMP. An increase in the real exchange 
rate is associated with an increase in both Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Girton and Roper (1976) 
measures. Trade openness is relevant with a small coefficient for Girton and Roper (1976) EMP 
                                                           
10 As recommended by the Referee, we also experiment  with  other measures of financial openness (i.e. capital 
controls). We considered Quinn and Toyoda (2008) and Dreher (2006, 2015) capital openness measures, since these 
had reasonable time spans covering our dataset. Therefore, we replicated the results in Table 2 and these also 
identified a strong link between financial openness and exchange market pressure. See Quinn et al. (2011) for an 
extensive discussion of different measure of capital account openness.  
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in column [3] and [4] of Table 3. The reserve import ratio and real income are significant but 
they have the opposite sign with the two measures of market pressure. Money is unimportant for 
EMP in advanced economies, possibly since monetary policy has been more prudent for much of 
our data period and less likely to induce currency difficulties. 
Next we consider whether capital controls are equally important for  emerging market 
economies  using  IV  estimation.  Table  4  presents  mixed  evidence  on  the  impact  of  capital 
controls on EMP for these countries. There is some evidence of the relevance of capital account 
openness using the Girton and Roper measure. However, this is only borderline significant at the 
5% significance level. EMP2 is also a less complete measure since it does not account for interest 
rate changes and the components of the market pressure index are equally weighted, unlike our 
preferred  measure  from  Eichengreen  et  al.  (1996).  Table  4  indicates  that  growth  in  money 
aggregates is connected to increasing EMP, consistent with expectations that loose monetary 
policy  weakens  the  currency.  This  contrasts  with  the  insignificance  of  money  growth  for 
advanced  economies’  EMP,  affirming  their  improved  monetary  conduct.  Focusing  upon  our 
preferred measure EMP1 in columns [1] and [2] of Table 4, nominal anchors of a fixed exchange 
rate regime and inflation targeting, and increased levels of reserves are associated with a decline 
in exchange market pressure in emerging markets.   
[TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Finally, we present results from Probit estimation to examine crisis situations in the FX 
market.
11 Eichengreen and Rose (2014a,b) mention that although  they are rare, financial crisis 
can cause  countries to introduce capital controls, for example Iceland  in 2008 and Cyprus in 
                                                           
11 Due to space constraints, we focus upon our preferred Eichengreen et al. (1993) measure of EMP in the Probit 
analysis.  
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2013. We use a limited dependent variable to indicate when there are extreme movements in 
EMP,  since  these  are  potentially  situations  a  government  would  wish  to  influence  by  using 
capital  controls.  Table  5 column [2]  shows  that  while exchange market  pressure in  extreme 
circumstances  is negatively  associated  with  liberalization in  advanced  economies,  this  is  not 
statistically significant at the 10% level. The level of reserves, real exchange rate and growth rate 
are most important in a crisis for EMP. Also, emerging market economies capital controls have 
little statistical connection to EMP. Monetary policy, by way of money growth and reserves, are 
more important for EMP in a crisis for emerging markets. Hence, we extend the Probit results of 
Glick and Hutchinson (2011) to both emerging markets and advanced economies, implying that 
capital controls have little impact in extreme market situations. This suggests that underlying 
fundamentals are more important for ‘extreme’ currency movements, possibly because capital 
controls are more slowly moving than currency crises, see Eichengreen and Rose (2014a). 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
To summarize our results overall, the negative relationship between market pressure and 
capital account openness, evidenced in Tables 2, 3 and 4, indicate that an increase in financial 
openness is linked to a reduction in pressure on EMP, especially for advanced countries. Hence, 
more open advanced economies, with respect to the capital account, are less likely to experience 
negative  speculative attacks in  normal  times.  It  appears  beneficial for advanced  countries  to 
liberalize their financial sector. For emerging markets, capital account openness seems only to be 
relevant for the Girton and Roper measure. As the Girton and Roper measure does not cover 
interest  rates and  weighs the components  of EMP  equally, there is  some doubt  cast  on this 
finding. Other significant determinants relevant for EMP include the real money supply, fixed 
and  intermediate  exchange  rate  regimes,  the  reserve  import  ratio  and  real  exchange  rate.  
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Furthermore, strong growth in real income implies strong currencies, a finding consistent with 
the Balassa-Samuelson hypothesis and first generation currency crisis models that emphasize the 
importance of sound macroeconomic fundamentals for avoiding speculative attacks. Therefore, 
countries  also  have  to  be  cognizant  of  developments  in  domestic  real  income,  if  they  are 
concerned  with  avoiding  pressure  on  their  currencies.  The  results  for  advanced  economies 
confirm earlier empirical evidence that documents a negative relationship between liberalized 
capital account and the likelihood of currency crisis. In general the estimated coefficients for 
additional explicators are plausible. 
4. Conclusion 
  An earlier empirical literature provided mixed evidence of the effectiveness of capital 
controls. This paper utilized the Chinn and Ito (2008) capital account index to measure capital 
account  openness  and  to  consider  the  consequences  of  financial  openness  for  the  foreign 
exchange market.  Furthermore, we also used continuous measures of exchange market pressure 
from Eichengreen et al. (1996) and Girton and Roper (1977). The results indicate that capital 
account  openness  is  an  important  correlate  with  our  two  measures  of  market  pressure  for 
advanced economies. For emerging market economies, capital account openness appears to be 
relevant for the Girton and Roper measure. Differences in the effects of capital account openness 
for advanced and emerging market economies may be due to the depth and development of the 
financial sector, strong checks and balances and the quality of regulatory institutions in advanced 
countries (Eichengreen and Rose, 2014a). Our results were robust to different measures of capital 
controls. Other relevant determinants of EMP are the real money supply, real exchange rate, 
fixed and intermediate exchange rate regime, reserve import ratio and real income. Probit results 
were less supportive of capital controls than IV. Capital controls appear to be less relevant in  
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times  of  acute  market  stress,  which  may  partly  be  due  to  their  slow  moving  nature,  see 
Eichengreen and Rose (2014a). Hence it is important for countries to formulate growth oriented 
policies and be cognizant of developments in other relevant macroeconomic determinants like 
money, reserves and the real exchange rate to avoid speculative attacks on their currencies.     
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Table 1. List of Countries 
Advanced Economies 
Australia,  Austria,  Canada,  Denmark,  Finland,  Germany,  Greece,  Ireland,  Italy,  Japan,  Korea,  
Netherland, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden, Singapore, Spain, Switzerland and the United Kingdom. 
 
Emerging Markets 
Algeria,  Argentina,  Brazil,  China,  Colombia,  Egypt,  India,  Indonesia,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Nigeria, 
Pakistan, Philippine, Qatar, South Africa, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Syria, Thailand, Tunisia and Turkey.  
Notes: There are 40 countries in the unbalanced panel dataset between 1977 and 2012. Division of countries into 
advanced  economies  and  emerging  market  countries  is  from  IMF  World  Economic  Outlook 
[https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2014/01/weodata/groups.htm]. 
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Table 2. Exchange Market Pressure and Capital Controls  
Dependent  EMP1  EMP1  EMP1  EMP2  EMP2 
Estimator 
Explicator 
FE 
[1] 
IV 
[2] 
IV 
[3] 
IV 
[4] 
IV 
[5] 
it K   -0.012  -0.065  -0.123*  -0.052**  -0.032** 
(-0.157)  (-0.675)  (-1.822)  (-3.068)  (-2.991) 
it O   -0.01  -0.011    0.004**  0.003** 
(-1.134)  (-1.184)    (2.522)  (3.105) 
it Fixed   -0.429**  -0.415*    -0.032   
(-1.984)  (-1.876)    (-0.815)   
it IT   -0.237  -0.221    0.007   
(-1.498)  (-1.318)    (0.245)   
it Intermed   -0.098  -0.103    -0.055*   
(-0.615)  (-0.630)    (-1.936)   
it m    0.781**  0.760**  0.892**  0.318**  0.343** 
(2.320)  (2.238)  (2.737)  (5.333)  (6.612) 
it q    4.670**  4.766**  5.594**  0.295**  0.334** 
(9.214)  (9.119)  (11.289)  (3.224)  (4.203) 
it r    -4.443**  -4.350**  -3.967**  0.839**  0.846** 
(-13.378)  (-12.907)  (-13.504)  (14.199)  (17.916) 
it rem    -0.441*  -0.403    -0.01   
(-1.701)  (-1.537)    (-0.222)   
it y    -2.395**  -2.354**  -1.491**  -0.047   
(-2.278)  (-2.227)  (-2.012)  (-0.253)   
Constant  0.474**  0.510**  0.266**  -0.534**  -0.461** 
(2.828)  (2.974)  (3.953)  (-17.747)  (-44.119) 
           
NT  1119  1091  1358  1091  1343 
N  39  39  40  39  40 
2 R   0.207  0.205  0.196  0.220  0.255 
F-statistic  27.991**  26.910**  63.749**  29.936**  89.474** 
F p-value  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Notes:  This  table  investigates  the  impact  of  capital  controls  upon  Exchange  Market  Pressure  measures  from 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) (EMP1) and Girton and Roper (1977) (EMP2). The sample period is 1977 to 2012, for up 
to 40 Advanced and Emerging Market Economies in an unbalanced panel. Estimation of equation (7) is by panel 
fixed effects (FE) in column [1] and panel instrumental variables (IV) with fixed effects (i.e. 2SLS) in columns 
[2]-[5]. For IV endogenous variables are instrumented by lagged values. Estimation is based upon equation (7). See 
Table B in the Appendix for a list of explicators. T-statistics are in parentheses (.). Asterisks (**) and (*) indicate 
that estimated parameters are significant at five and ten percent significance level respectively. NT is the number of 
observations. N is the number of countries. We present within R
2. F-statistic tests the joint null of insignificant 
estimated parameters. F-statistic p-values in square brackets [.]. 
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Table 3. EMP and Capital Controls: Advanced Economies IV Estimation 
Dependent  EMP1  EMP1  EMP2  EMP2 
Estimator 
Explicator 
IV 
[1] 
IV 
[2] 
IV 
[3] 
IV 
[4] 
it K   -0.210**  -0.212**  -0.011**  -0.012** 
(-1.964)  (-3.150)  (-3.107)  (-5.043) 
it O   -0.016    0.003**  0.003** 
(-1.165)    (7.148)  (7.170) 
it Fixed   0.237    -0.001   
(1.024)    (-0.132)   
it IT   -0.09    -0.005   
(-0.531)    (-0.883)   
it Intermed   0.089    -0.002   
(0.497)    (-0.264)   
it m    0.290    -0.004   
(0.847)    (-0.395)   
it q    19.117**  19.408**  0.436**  0.440** 
(15.570)  (17.610)  (11.012)  (11.216) 
it r    -6.886**  -6.873**  0.939**  0.939** 
(-14.314)  (-15.869)  (60.571)  (61.335) 
it rem    0.594    0.059**  0.059** 
(1.310)    (4.030)  (4.054) 
it y    -31.298**  -35.556**  1.512**  1.530** 
(-5.149)  (-6.875)  (7.716)  (8.011) 
Constant  0.684**  0.859**  0.032**  0.031** 
(2.686)  (5.998)  (3.923)  (6.128) 
         
NT  550  645  550  550 
N  18  19  18  18 
2 R   0.478  0.491  0.893  0.892 
F-statistic  47.642**  148.881**  433.94**  726.784** 
F p-value  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Notes:  This  table  investigates  the  determinants  of  Exchange  Market  Pressure  measures  from 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) (EMP1) and Girton and Roper (1977) (EMP2). Sample 1977 to 2012 for 
up  to  19  advanced  economies  in  this  unbalanced  panel.  Estimation  is  by  panel  instrumental 
variables with fixed effects. Endogenous variables are instrumented. T-statistics are in parentheses 
(.).Asterisks (**) and (*) indicate that estimated parameters are significant at five and ten percent 
significance level respectively. NT is the number of observations. N is the number of countries. We 
present  within  R
2.  The  F-statistic  tests  the  joint  null  of  insignificant  estimated  parameters.  F 
statistics p-values in square brackets [.]. 
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Table 4. EMP and Capital Controls: Emerging Markets IV Estimation 
Dependent  EMP1  EMP1  EMP2  EMP2 
Estimator 
Explicator 
IV 
[1] 
IV 
[2] 
IV 
[3] 
IV 
[4] 
it K   0.029  0.005  -0.073*  -0.048** 
  (0.179)  (0.042)  (-1.881)  (-1.964) 
it O   -0.023**    0.004*  0.005** 
(-2.065)    (1.660)  (2.520) 
it Fixed   -1.115**  -0.901**  0.022   
(-2.911)  (-3.631)  (0.244)   
it IT   -0.696**  -0.577**  0.035   
(-2.217)  (-2.376)  (0.474)   
it Intermed   -0.216    0.009   
(-0.744)    (0.133)   
it m    2.105**  2.285**  0.839**  0.853** 
(3.422)  (4.164)  (5.752)  (7.698) 
it q    2.481**  3.136**  0.181   
(4.275)  (5.755)  (1.313)   
it r    -3.476**  -3.025**  0.814**  0.829** 
(-8.123)  (-8.447)  (8.016)  (10.918) 
it rem    -0.494    -0.035   
(-1.626)    (-0.489)   
it y    -1.901*    -0.064   
(-1.730)    (-0.247)   
Constant  0.798**  0.460**  -1.336**  -1.002** 
(2.359)  (3.599)  (-16.662)  (-50.499) 
         
NT  541  702  541  701 
N  21  21  21  21 
2 R   0.209  0.189  0.206  0.240 
F-statistic  13.428**  26.147**  13.595**  54.152** 
F p-value  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Notes:  This  table  investigates  the  determinants  of  Exchange  Market  Pressure  measures  from 
Eichengreen et al. (1996) (EMP1) and Girton and Roper (1977) (EMP2). Sample 1977 to 2012 for up 
to 21 emerging markets in this unbalanced panel. Estimation is by panel instrumental variables with 
fixed effects. Endogenous variables are instrumented. T-statistics are in parentheses (.).Asterisks (**) 
and (*) indicate  that estimated parameters are  significant at five and ten percent  significance level 
respectively.NT is the number of observations. N is the number of countries. We present within R
2. The 
F-statistic  tests  the  joint  null  of  insignificant  estimated  parameters.  F  statistics  p-values  in  square 
brackets [.]. 
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Table 5. Probit Estimation of Exchange Market Pressure  
Sample  Full  Advanced  Emerging 
Estimator 
Explicator 
Probit 
[1] 
Probit 
[2] 
Probit 
[3] 
it K   0.026  -0.068  0.027 
(0.682)  (-0.760)  (0.473) 
it O        
     
it Fixed        
     
it IT        
     
it Intermed   0.218**     
(2.157)     
it m    0.561*    0.862** 
(1.784)    (2.272) 
it q    1.383**  10.121**   
(2.838)  (4.349)   
it r    -2.352**  -3.994  -2.081** 
(-6.127)  (-4.508)  (-4.917) 
it rem         
     
it y      -42.283**   
  (-4.410)   
Constant  -1.815**  -1.355**  -1.627** 
(-15.281)  (-6.287)  (-18.198) 
       
NT  1385  665  740 
N  40  19  21 
LL  -314.38  -124.832  -173.207 
Notes: Sample 1977 to 2012. This table investigates the determinants of Eichengreen et al. 
(1996) Crisis Index, using Probit random effects estimation. Values in parentheses (.) are 
t-statistics. Asterisks (**) and (*) indicate that estimated parameters are significant at five 
and ten percent significance levels respectively. NT is the number of observation. N is the 
number of countries in the panel. LL is log likelihood ratio statistic.    
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Appendix  
Table A Recent Brazilian Capital Controls 
 
Date  Restriction  Measure 
10/9/2009  Tighten  Tighten Tax of 2 percent on portfolio equity and fixed income inflows 
11/8/2009  Tighten  Tax of 1.5 percent on the issuance of depository receipts  into local equities 
10/4/2010  Tighten  Tax rate raised to 4 percent for fixed income inflows 
10/18/2010  Tighten  Tax rate was raised to 6 percent for fixed income inflows 
12/30/2010  Tighten  Tax of 2 percent on the cancellation of depository receipts into local equities. 
1/6/2011  Tighten  Unremunerated  reserve  requirement  of  60 percent  on  bank's  gross  FX  positions  beyond 
US$3 billions 
3/28/2011  Tighten  Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad with maturity below one year 
4/6/2011  Tighten  Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad extended to maturity below two years 
7/8/2011  Tighten  Unremunerated  reserve  requirement  of  60 percent  on  bank's  gross  FX  positions  beyond 
US$1 billion 
7/26/2011  Tighten  Tighten Tax on notional amount of currency derivatives 
12/1/2011  Loosen  Tax on portfolio equity inflows eliminated 
2/29/2012  Tighten  Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad extended to maturity below three years 
3/1/2012  Tighten  Restricts anticipation of payments to exporters to one year horizon 
3/9/2012  Tighten  Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad extended to maturity below five years 
3/152012  Loosen  Tax on derivatives set to zero for hedging by exporters ( up to 1.2 times exports in previous 
year 
6/14/2012  Loosen  Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad restricted to maturities below two years 
6/28/2012  Loosen  Anticipation of payments to exporters can be done by financial institutions. 
12/4/2012  Loosen  Anticipation of payments to exporters allowed for horizon above one year but below five 
years 
12/5/2012  Loosen  Tax of 6 percent on borrowing abroad restricted to maturities below one year 
12/18/2012  Loosen  Unremunerated reserve requirement on bank’s gross foreign exchange position only after 
US $ 3 billions 
6/4/2012  Loosen  Tax on fixed income flows eliminated 
6/12/2012  Loosen  Tax on notional amount of derivatives eliminated 
Notes: Data are from Chamon and Garcia (2013). All tightening restrictions were announced when the market was 
closed,  and  became  effective  on  the  following  business  day.  The  only  exception  was  the  January  6,  2011 
unremunerated reserve requirement (URR) on Banks’ Gross FX Positions which only became effective three months 
later.  
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Table B. List of Variables and Data Sources 
Variable  Source 
EMP1  Exchange Market Pressure Index from Eichengreen et al. (1996) [IFS] 
EMP2  Exchange Market Pressure Index from Girton and Roper (1977) [IFS] 
it K   Chinn and Ito (2008) Capital Account Openness Index 
it O   Trade Openness which is the change in exports plus imports as a % of GDP [WDI] 
it IT   Dummy variable capturing inflation targeting monetary policy regime 
it q    Real Exchange rate constructed by adjusting domestic and foreign price ratio with nominal 
Exchange rate [WDI] 
it r    Reserve import ratio [WDI] 
it m    Monetary aggregate (M2) [IFS] 
it rem    Workers’ remittances and compensation of employees paid [WDI] 
it y    Real GDP growth [WDI] 
Fixedit  Dummy variables capturing fixed exchange rate regime, from Ilzezki et al. (2008) 
Intermedit  Dummy variable capturing intermediate exchange rate regime, from Ilzezki et al. (2008) 
Notes: Data are from IMF International Financial Statistics [IFS] and World Bank World Development Indicators 
[WDI]. Δ denotes the first difference operator. The time dimension of this panel of annual data is 1977 to 2012. 
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Table C. De Facto Classification of Exchange Rate Regime 
Exchange Rate Regime  Code 
No Separate Legal Tender  1 
Preannounced peg or currency board arrangement  1 
Preannounced horizontal band that is narrower than or equal to   2%  1 
De facto peg  1 
Preannounced crawling peg  2 
Pre announced crawling band that is narrower than or equal to   2%  2 
De facto crawling peg  2 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to   2%  2 
Preannounced crawling band that is wider than   2%  2 
De facto crawling band that is narrower than or equal to   5%  3 
Non crawling band that is narrower than or equal to   2%  3 
Managed floating  3 
Freely floating  4 
Freely falling (includes hyperfloat)  5 
Dual market in which parallel market data is missing  6 
Notes: the source of this data is Ilzezki et al. (2008). Exchange rate regimes are classified from 1 to 6  
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Figure 1. Exchange Market Pressure and Capital Controls 
 
 
 
Notes: this graph presents Exchange Market Pressure data from Eichengreen et al. (1996) (grey line) and 
Capital Controls (black line). Data is for Australia, Argentina, Brazil and Spain between 1977 and 2012. A 
rise in EMP is a rise in FX market pressure (left hand scale). A rise in the capital account openness index is 
a fall in capital controls (right hand scale). Correlations between EMP and controls for these countries are 
negative, and range from -0.04 for Spain and -0.36 for Brazil. Australia and Argentina correlations are        
-0.10 and -0.30 respectively. 
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